Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 30
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
Intellectual Property Online: The Challenge of
Multi-Territorial Disputes

Article 12

2005

Judging the Judges: Dispute Resolution at the
Olympic Games
Kristin L. Savarese

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Kristin L. Savarese, Judging the Judges: Dispute Resolution at the Olympic Games, 30 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol30/iss3/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

File: SavareseMACRO.06.08.05.doc

Created on: 6/8/2005 1:43 PM

Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:48 PM

JUDGING THE JUDGES: DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES
I. INTRODUCTION

D

uring the men’s gymnastics individual event final at the
2004 Athens Games, Russian gymnast Aleksei Nemov
dismounted from the high bar to the cheers of the crowd.1 Once
Nemov’s low scores were posted, those cheers turned to an angry roar that rocked the Olympic Indoor Hall, halting competition for ten minutes.2 Then, suddenly, the scores changed.3 In
the midst of the chaos, two of the six judges had reconsidered
their decisions in an apparent attempt to assuage the crowd.4
Nemov went on to place fifth.5
Intense media coverage of such judging mishaps has overshadowed the athletics at recent Olympic Games.6 Perhaps it is
the inevitable result of the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, where a
double gold medal was awarded after a French figure skating
judge admitted accepting a bribe.7 Perhaps it is the result of a
1. Rachel Cohen, Accountable Mistakes Happen, but Now Judges Hear it
When They Mess Up, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, at 4CC.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. The fallout from such unprofessional conduct by the Malaysian
and Canadian judges would have been worse had Nemov managed to win a
medal with his inflated scores. Instead, he came in fifth. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Cohen, supra note 1; Jere Longman, Olympics: The Scorekeepers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at D1 (profiling a Salt Lake City judge who withdrew, unnerved by charges of political and cultural biases aimed at competition judges); Candus Thomson & Randy Harvey, An Abundance of Objections
is Testing Games’ Machinery for Settling Protests, BALT. SUN, Aug. 24, 2004, at
1A (noting the challenges to judging calls in gymnastics, swimming, equestrian and sailing competitions in Athens). See also Selena Roberts, Editorial,
IOC Leadership is Lacking a Pulse. Is There a Doctor in the House?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at Sports 8 (criticizing the International Olympic Committee for ignoring judging problems in order to avoid confrontation with the
international sports federations).
7. See Christopher Clarey, Skating Federation Turns Its Focus to Judging
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at D1. At the 2002 Salt Lake City Games,
French figure skating judge Marie Reine Le Gougne confessed that she had
been pressured by the president of her national skating federation to favor the
Russians over the Canadians in the pairs figure skating event. In response,
the International Olympic Committee made the unprecedented decision to
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more litigious society in general; most delegations arrive at the
Olympic Village with lawyers in tow.8 Perhaps the focus has
been sharpened because sporting stakes, especially at the
Olympics, are higher: prize money, commercial endorsements
and appearance fees can add up to millions of dollars for medallists.9 Perhaps it is as simple as technology—judging errors are
easy to spot thanks to video replay.10 Whatever the reason,
Olympic disputes are more heated and high profile than ever
before.
The Athens Games was no exception. The fallout from the
Nemov incident was quickly obscured by a more contentious
controversy, the gold medal fight between American Paul
Hamm and South Korean Yang Tae Young.11 Yang was mistakenly docked one-tenth of a point at the start of his parallel
bars routine during the men’s gymnastics all-around competition.12 Had he been given the proper starting score—and had
award a duplicate set of gold medals to the Canadian team. Id. The controversy prompted the International Skating Union to implement an improved
scoring system. Selena Roberts, Skating Group Proposes a New System of
Judging, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at A1.
8. See Peta Bee, Editorial, Olympic Ideals Taken Over by Tantrums and
Tears, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 30, 2004, at 25 (criticizing “sore-loser athletes” for accusing judges of cheating, rule-breaking and favoritism). In recent
years, with doping, performance-enhancing drugs, videotaping of events, etc.,
athletes have become more aware of their rights and the ways to protect them.
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 64 (2d ed. 2004).
9. See Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic
Athletes: Is the Process Better or Worse for ‘Job Security’?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 655, 664 (1998) (noting that gymnast Kerri Strug and sprinter Michael
Johnson were projected to make $2 million each in 1996, based on their
performances in the Atlanta Games).
10. The use of technology to resolve controversial field-of-play calls in international competition is less common than in professional sports, but it is
growing, especially in track-and-field, international wrestling and cricket. In
contrast, the international football and tennis federations have banned the
use of video replay. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 116–20.
11. See Bee, supra note 8.
12. Candus Thomson, Arbiters Hear Appeal of Men’s All-Around, BALT.
SUN, Sept. 28, 2004, at 2E. In gymnastics, the highest possible point value of
a routine is determined at the outset, based on the level of difficulty of the
planned routine, in accordance with the International Gymnastics Federation’s Code of Points. See id. Yang’s routine should have been given a higher
point value due to its difficult elements. See Alan Abrahamson & Diane
Pucin, Hamm Takes Issue with Medal Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2004, at
D1.
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the rest of the evening’s competition played out the same—Yang
would have beaten Hamm to take the gold by 0.051 of a point.13
The controversy stemmed not only from the judging error made
during the competition, but also from the International Gymnastics Federation’s response to the aftermath.14
Since 1996, all Olympic disputes have been submitted to an
independent arbitral tribunal, the International Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), for mandatory, binding arbitration.15
The International Olympic Committee (IOC), which organizes
the Games, instituted this policy after a rash of lengthy multimillion dollar battles in various domestic courts in the 1990s.16
One notorious example was the case of American track star and
Olympic gold medallist Harry “Butch” Reynolds.17 The governing body of international track-and-field competitions, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), suspended
Reynolds for two years in 1990 for alleged steroid use, effectively ending his chance to compete in the 1992 Olympic
Games.18 Reynolds filed an appeal in a U.S. court—a move that
13. Thomson, supra note 12.
14. The Yang case is discussed in depth, infra Part III.A. For now it is
enough to note that the International Gymnastics Federation did not handle
the situation in accordance with its own rules and regulations. The muchpublicized controversy did not subside until months later, when the Court of
Arbitration for Sport issued a ruling denying South Korea’s appeal. See CAS
Turns Down Yang’s Petition, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004.
15. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 74, available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/
pdf/en_report_122.pdf (in force as of Sept. 1, 2004). Rule 74 mandates that all
Olympic participants submit disputes to the CAS, an international organization of sports arbiters that hears both Olympic and non-Olympic sporting
disputes, including private commercial claims. Matthieu Reeb, The Court of
Arbitration for Sport, History, CAS website, at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/hist
oire/frmhist.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
16. See Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for
Olympic Ailments: The International Olympic Committee’s Court of Arbitration for Sport and the Future for the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 347 (1994). See also Steve Buffery, Atlanta
’96 Column, TORONTO SUN, June 9, 1996, at 16 (“It seems any time an American athlete tests positive, a local court instantly reinstates them and then
they launch a multi-million dollar lawsuit.”). Just before the 1996 Atlanta
Games, American heptathlete Gea Johnson filed a $12 million lawsuit against
the international track-and-field federation for banning her for steroid use.
Id.
17. See Polvino, supra note 16, at 347.
18. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 660.
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sparked jurisdictional conflicts between the U.S. Olympic
Committee and the IAAF and led to fifteen different stages of
litigation and arbitration.19 Despite the IAAF’s refusal to acknowledge U.S. jurisdiction, even after the Supreme Court intervened, a district court finally ruled in Reynolds’ favor and
awarded him a $27.3 million default judgment that the IAAF
refused to pay.20 Reynolds’ victory, however, came too late. The
1992 Olympic Games had come and gone in the four years it
took for him to get through litigation.21
The Reynolds saga illustrates the problem of bringing suit in
domestic courts in matters that implicate the entire Olympic
Movement, an interconnected web of international, national,
governmental and non-governmental institutions, each with its
own statutes, jurisdiction and procedures.22 The IOC had recognized the need for a tribunal equipped to handle such complexity when it created the CAS in the early 1980s to arbitrate
disputes voluntarily submitted to it by international sports bodies; however, in the wake of the Reynolds debacle, the IOC recruited the CAS to be the official arbiter of the Olympics.23 To
meet the special needs of the Games, the CAS created an ad hoc
Division, a small group of arbiters installed in each Olympic
Village to issue final, binding decisions within twenty-four
hours of the complaint.24 Forcing Olympic participants to ac19. See James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161, 172 (2002). See also Bitting, supra note 9, at 661.
20. Polvino, supra note 16, at 354–56 (“When asked if the award to Reynolds would be paid, [IAAF President Primo] Nebiolo stated: ‘Never, never . . .
he can live 200 years.’”). Id. at 356.
21. See id. at 347. This was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court had
ever ruled on an Olympic matter involving competition. Justice Stevens, in
his capacity as a circuit Justice, granted Reynolds’ application for a stay of the
Sixth Circuit’s order barring the IAAF from interfering with Reynolds’ eligibility for the 1992 U.S. Olympic Trials. The stay was later upheld by the entire
Supreme Court. Id. at 353.
22. The Olympic Movement is the dominant international sports institution and provides the framework for world competitions. See Nafziger, supra
note 19, at 162.
23. See Reeb, supra note 15, History of the CAS § 1.
24. Id. The CAS’s ad hoc Division, explained in detail, infra Part II.C, is a
decentralized, temporary branch of the CAS adapted to fit the needs of Olympic participants who want disputes resolved in time for the remedy to be of
use during the Games. The CAS has ad hoc branches not only at the Olym-
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cept the CAS as their final legal recourse was a novel, risky
idea.25 To effectuate the change at the 1996 Atlanta Games, the
IOC required that all athletes, coaches and officials contractually waive their right to sue in civil courts.26 It introduced a
clause into the Eligibility Entry Form binding the signer to the
arbitration scheme.27 The version for the 2004 Athens Games
reads:
I agree that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, in
connection with, or on the occasion of, the Olympic Games, not
resolved after exhaustion of the legal remedies established by
. . . the International Federation governing my sport . . . and
the IOC, shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) for final and binding arbitration . . . .
The CAS shall rule on its jurisdiction and has the exclusive
power to order provisional and conservatory measures. The
decisions of the CAS shall be final and binding. I shall not institute any claim, arbitration or litigation, or seek any form of
relief, in any other court or tribunal.28

Although there was doubt that the 11,000 athletes from 197
countries who showed up to compete in Atlanta would willingly
sign away their right to sue, the implementation of the ad hoc
Division was largely uneventful.29 For most Olympic participics, but also at the Commonwealth Games and the European Football Championships. Id.
25. The IOC amended the Olympic Charter to add Rule 74, which directs
all disputes to arbitration by the CAS. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 74.
26. See Urvasi Naidoo & Neil Sarin, Dispute Resolution at Game Time, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 489, 492–93 (2002) (describing the
contractual obligations of Olympic participants).
27. Id. at 493. However, the CAS allows for appeal of its decisions to the
Swiss Federal Tribunal, a domestic Swiss court, on limited grounds. See id.
28. Eligibility Entry Form of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, SPORTS
ENTRIES AND QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM 8, at http://www.athens2004.com/Files/
files/Pdf-Sports/SEQ_MASTER_1_EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). In addition to the entry form, the CAS’s jurisdiction is asserted in Rule 74 of the
Olympic Charter; furthermore, many sports bodies have written CAS jurisdiction into their by-laws. GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE
OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 16,
24–25 (2001).
29. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 663; Buffery, supra note 16 (discussing the
controversy over the newly-required waiver); Mike Fish, Atlanta Grand Prix;
Drug Testing; IAAF Talking Tough in Johnson Case, ATL. J. & CONST., May
18, 1996, at 9E (quoting Butch Reynolds as agreeing to the waiver, along with
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pants, there is no other viable option.30 Contesting mandatory
arbitration in a court of law, as either unconscionable or as a
contract of adhesion, might mean a drawn-out court battle
reminiscent of Reynolds’.31 Furthermore, most athletes’ financial support from their national committees to train and compete is contingent upon their Olympic eligibility.32 For the serious medal contenders, the Olympic Games mean prize monies
and lucrative endorsements, not to mention a chance to fulfill a
dream.33 With so much at stake, an athlete is unlikely to forfeit
competition because of an unwillingness to submit to the CAS.
Because Olympic participants waive a powerful right to sue
in domestic courts, the IOC’s arbitration scheme must be a worthy substitute.34 The introduction of the ad hoc Division has
largely been a success, but problems persist.35 The IOC has not
devoted enough attention to the international federations’ internal appeals systems—morasses of rules governing how
members can protest decisions.36 Internal appeals are integral
to the IOC’s larger arbitration scheme because a claimant cannot petition the CAS without first exhausting the offending federation’s own remedies; furthermore, the CAS must consider
the federation’s applicable rules and regulations as part of the
law governing the dispute.37
eight-time gold medallist Carl Lewis, and noting track star Michael Johnson’s
hesitation to sign).
30. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 665 (discussing athletes’ financial dependence on Olympic eligibility).
31. See id. at 669 (analogizing the eligibility clause to an employment contract, subject to common law defenses).
32. Id. at 665.
33. See id. at 664.
34. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 35–36 (noting that most issues in international sports are procedural—how to expeditiously and fairly resolve disputes—not disagreements over fundamental values or public policy).
35. See infra Part III.
36. See HON. MICHAEL J. BELOFF ET AL., SPORTS LAW §§ 2.38–.39 (1999)
(noting that the notoriously murky rules of sports organizations are often
drafted by non-lawyers and even those that are lawyer-drafted are not necessarily more clear); KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 100 (KaufmannKohler, an ad hoc arbiter in Atlanta, Nagano and Sydney, criticizes federation
rules as being “incomplete, incoherent and badly drafted”).
37. The CAS’s rules concerning the ad hoc Division are set forth in the
ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, available at http://www.tascas.org/en/pdf/reglementJO.pdf (in force as of Dec. 17, 2003). Article 1 reads:
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If a federation’s internal remedies are inadequate, it becomes
acutely obvious whenever an athlete challenges a decision to
the CAS.38 Although the CAS does not review technical determinations, it does evaluate whether the rule at issue, or its application, was arbitrary or illegal.39 This requires analyzing the
circumstances surrounding an alleged error, examining the federation’s appeals mechanism, and determining whether it
worked appropriately in the particular case.40 More often than
not, such an inquiry results in the CAS’s criticism of the federation’s rules, procedures or policies.41 While the federations
themselves used to be the final arbiters of their members’ challenges, the CAS is now in that position; its independent review
has exposed many internal failings, namely, appeals systems
that are inefficient, unpredictable and inadequate.42
Part II of this Note describes the framework of the IOC’s arbitration scheme, including the organization of the CAS and its
specialized Olympic branch, the ad hoc Division. Part III looks
at the persisting problem of the international federations’
In the case of a request for arbitration against a decision pronounced
by the IOC, [a National Olympic Committee], an International Federation or an Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, the
claimant must, before filing such request, have exhausted all the internal remedies available to him/her pursuant to the statutes or regulations of the sports body concerned, unless the time needed to exhaust the internal remedies would make the appeal to the CAS ad
hoc Division ineffective.
Id. art. 1. “The Panel shall rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law,
the application of which it deems appropriate.” Id. art. 17.
38. Judging challenges are the majority of cases brought to the CAS during
the Olympic Games. Out of six ad hoc decisions from Athens, two involved
doping suspensions and four involved field-of-play decisions. All pitted players and/or their national committees against international federations. The
ad hoc Division’s most recent cases are posted under Case Law, CAS website,
at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/juris/frmjur.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
39. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 173. See also KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 25–26 (noting that arbitrators will refrain from interfering
with the determinations made on the playing field by judges, referees, umpires, or other officials, unless the rules have been applied in bad faith or maliciously).
40. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 7.116–.127, 8.108 (setting out the
legal principles the CAS uses to evaluate disputes).
41. See infra Part III.
42. See id.
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flawed appellate processes. Part IV suggests what might be
done to improve the situation and to guarantee Olympic participants the best substitute possible for their waived right to
sue. It proposes that the IOC create and implement a model
internal appeals system for the federations to adopt, along the
lines of the anti-doping rules promulgated by the IOC and the
World Anti-Doping Agency. Part V posits that a uniform system would contribute to the developing body of lex sportiva, or
sports law, as well as the IOC’s and the CAS’s positions as
stewards of this movement.
II. THE PLAYERS IN THE IOC’S SCHEME
A. The International Olympic Committee and the
Olympic Movement
The IOC, a non-governmental, non-profit international organization, was founded in 1894 by French educator Pierre de
Coubertin, who wished to revive the ancient Olympic Games in
the modern world.43 More than a century later, the IOC leads
the Olympic Movement, which is comprised of international
sports federations, national Olympic committees,44 organizing
committees of the Olympic Games, national athletic associations, and “other organizations and institutions as recognized
by the IOC,” such as the World Anti-Doping Agency.45 The IOC
43. OLYMPIC CHARTER pmbl. In 1896, the first modern Olympics was held
in Athens. Id.
44. The national Olympic committees (NOC’s) are composed of national
sports organizations affiliated with international federations. They oversee
sports activity on the national level and represent their delegations at IOCsponsored world competitions. The NOC’s are entrusted with deciding which
athletes will compete from those nominated by various national federations;
they ensure that athletes comply with all provisions of the Olympic Charter;
they provide for equipment, transportation and accommodation of athletes;
and they determine the clothing and uniforms to be worn. OLYMPIC CHARTER
R. 28–29.
45. The World Anti-Doping Agency, discussed infra Part IV.A, is an independent agency that oversees and administers the IOC-sponsored anti-doping
policy. Other examples of sports institutions recognized by the IOC as Olympic partners are the CAS, the International Committee for Fair Play, the International Paralympic Committee, and the World Olympians Association, to
name a few. For a list of all the Olympic partners, see the IOC website at
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/actions/index_uk.asp (last visited Apr.
14, 2005).
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coordinates and monitors all of these diverse bodies in its efforts
to organize elite sporting events and to promote ethics in
sports.46 In order to be recognized by the IOC—a requirement
of participation in IOC-sanctioned events including the
Games—these entities must ensure that their statutes, practices and activities conform to the Olympic Charter.47 They
must also comply with the obligations imposed upon them by
other governing umbrella organizations.48 For example, the
German Equestrian Association has contractual obligations to
the International Equestrian Federation, and both entities are
bound to the IOC through the Olympic Charter.49 Beyond observing the reciprocal rights and duties created by these obligations, the sports bodies operate autonomously.50 Therefore, the
rights and obligations of any participant in world sports, including clubs, athletes, judges, referees, coaches and sports technicians, are determined by overlapping contracts, codes and statutes.51

46. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 2. The IOC is recognized in international law as
a corporation with perpetual succession; therefore, it can act as a legal person
on the international plane. C. Christine Ansley, International Athletic Dispute Resolution: Tarnishing the Olympic Dream, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW
277, 283 (1995). It maintains its authority by retaining all rights relating to
the organization, marketing, broadcasting and reproduction of the Olympic
Games, the high visibility of which places the IOC at the forefront of the international sports world. See OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 6–14; NAFZIGER, supra
note 8, at 4. However, the IOC is a non-governmental organization with no
real method of compelling governmental compliance. It influences the development of international sports law through “rules, regulations and decisions
[that] help determine state practice and best articulate the accepted regime of
international sports law.” Id. at 5.
47. “Any person or organisation belonging in any capacity whatsoever to
the Olympic Movement is bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and
shall abide by the decisions of the IOC.” OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 1(2).
48. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 2.31–.32.
49. Id.
50. See Polvino, supra note 16, at 348–52; BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§
1.10, 2.32. See also NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 66 (comparing domestic suits
with private international lawsuits that raise complicated questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments).
51. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 2.32.
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B. The International Sports Federations
The IOC leaves the administration of each Olympic event to
the international federation governing that particular sport.52
These powerful non-governmental bodies run competitions at
the world level.53 Each federation has its own set of technical
rules governing the sport, procedural rules for internal appeals,
and sanctions for athletes, coaches and officials.54 The federations select judges, referees and other technical persons, establish the rules of judging and timing, set the results standards,
and certify the final results and rankings.55 There are currently
thirty-five federations that comply with the Olympic Charter
and are allowed to participate in the Olympic Games, other
IOC-sponsored events, and the annual meeting of the IOC Executive Board.56 In addition, the federations form various associations that meet to discuss common problems, to work out calendars of events and to combine forces when dealing with the
IOC.57
C. The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its ad hoc Division
The CAS was formally established as an international sports
tribunal in 1983, but it underwent a defining reformation in
1994 after the Swiss Federal Tribunal drew attention to the
CAS’s dependence on the IOC and potential problems of impartiality.58 In response, the IOC developed an independent body,
52. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 27.
53. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 659.
54. Id.
55. See OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 27.
56. International Sports Federations, IOC website, at http://www.olympic.
org/uk/organisation/if/index_uk.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). There are
over 100 international federations, however, only thirty-five are IOCrecognized as Olympic participants. See id. For a list of all the international
federations, see the General Association of International Sports Federations
website, at http://www.agfisonline.com/en/members.phtml (last visited Apr.
14, 2005).
57. The Olympic Charter gives the federations the right to “formulate proposals addressed to the IOC concerning the Olympic Charter and the Olympic
Movement; collaborate in the preparation of Olympic Congresses; and participate, on request from the IOC, in the activities of the IOC Commissions.”
OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 27.
58. Reeb, supra note 15, History of the CAS § 2. In its original form, the
CAS was almost entirely financed by the IOC; the IOC executive board was
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the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), to
control the CAS’s operations and financing in place of the IOC.59
This change went far in establishing the CAS’s credibility as it
continued to expand.60 In 1996 the CAS created two offices in
Denver and Sydney, in addition to its permanent seat in
Lausanne, Switzerland.61 In its short existence, the CAS has
heard some 576 cases, resulting in more than 314 awards and
sixteen advisory opinions.62 It has become a central mechanism
for resolving international sports disputes brought by individuals, federations and national governing bodies, ranging from
contractual (the validity of vendor contracts) to fundamental
(the eligibility or suspension of athletes).63 One of the reasons
for its rapid growth is that many federations have granted the
the only body with the power to change the CAS statute; and the IOC and its
president could together appoint thirty members of the CAS. Id.
59. See id. § 4. However, it should be noted that the CAS and ICAS still
have a connection to the IOC and other sports organizations. The twenty
members of ICAS, a mix of international jurists who are independent of sports
organizations, are appointed by the associations of international federations,
the NOC’s and the IOC. Furthermore, as of 2001, about seventy-five percent
of the budget of ICAS and CAS was funded in equal shares by the same organizations. The rest was paid by private companies using the CAS to arbitrate contract-based disputes. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 41–42.
60. The CAS solidified its two main arbitration divisions, one for ordinary
arbitration, where the CAS acts as the court in the sole instance, and the
other division for appeals arbitration where the CAS hears appeals of final
rulings. See Reeb, supra note 15, Organisation and Structure of ICAS and
CAS § 3. In addition to this growth, the CAS has been approved by several
domestic courts. The Court of Appeals of Munich, Germany, the Swiss Supreme Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeals, among others, have
held that the CAS is a “true” arbitral tribunal, i.e., a tribunal with a constitution over which no party exercises an overreaching influence, in contrast with
the internal tribunals of sports federations. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note
28, at 3–4, 16 n.42.
61. Reeb, supra note 15, Organisation and Structure of ICAS and CAS § 3.
The decentralized locations were created to provide sports participants from
around the world with greater accessibility to the CAS. Id.
62. These statistics reflect the complaints submitted to the CAS as of December 2003. Statistics, CAS website, at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/stat/
frmstat.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
63. Nafziger, supra note 19, at 167. The CAS also provides for mediation
services, where the parties choose their own mediator who does not craft a
solution like an arbitrator does, but instead facilitates an environment where
the parties can reach their own compromise position. See Reeb, supra note 15,
Organisation and Structure of the ICAS and CAS § 1.
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CAS compulsory jurisdiction by including mandatory arbitration clauses in their business contracts.64
The ad hoc Division, the twenty-four hour arbiter of Olympic
disputes, has been tailored to fit the needs of the Olympic
Games, i.e., to be “simple, flexible and free of charge.”65 A
claimant disputing a decision by the IOC, a federation or a national committee, who has exhausted the organization’s internal
remedies,66 must present a written complaint to the Division
stating the claim, legal arguments and requested relief.67 There
is then a hearing before a panel of three Division arbiters.68
They are all neutral third parties with legal training and
proven expertise in sports law.69 The Division considers the
organization’s constitution, its powers over the claimant’s person or property, its adherence to the principles of good faith and
general contract law, and its compliance with procedural fairness.70 It resolves the dispute “pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the
rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate.”71
64. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 166–68. Like the IOC, many federations have provisions in their contracts binding participants in federationsanctioned events to arbitration. Id.
65. Reeb, supra note 15, Decentralised CAS Offices and the Ad Hoc Divisions para. 2. The Division’s jurisdiction includes “any disputes covered by
Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter, insofar as they arise during the Olympic
Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony of the
Olympic Games.” ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 1.
66. ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 1.
67. Id. art. 10.
68. Id. arts. 11–12. In Atlanta, the ad hoc Division was composed of two
co-presidents and twelve arbiters chosen from the more than 150 arbiters of
the CAS, although the size varies with the competition. Reeb, supra note 15,
Decentralised CAS Offices and the Ad Hoc Divisions para. 2. In Nagano, for
example, the number of arbiters was reduced to six. Id. para. 3. However, to
save time and reduce the risk of arbiters being challenged, the parties are not
allowed to choose which arbiters will hear their particular case. KAUFMANNKOHLER, supra note 28, at 43.
69. ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 12. An effort is made
to choose an arbiter who is an expert in the particular sport in contention. Rt.
Hon. Sir Philip Otton, Sport–Private Grief or Public Prurience, The Master of
the Livery’s Annual Lecture before the Worshipful Company of Arbitrators
¶ 45 (Mar. 30, 2004), at http://www.arbitratorscompany.org/pdfs/Masters_
Lecture_2004.pdf.
70. Nafziger, supra note 19, at 168.
71. ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 17.
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The Division has two options at the close of arbitration, either
to make a final award or to refer the dispute to arbitration by
the full CAS, in which case it will grant preliminary relief.72
While this latter option works against the idea of the ad hoc
Division as a quick arbiter,73 some cases require removal to the
CAS because of the claimant’s “request for relief, the complexity
of the dispute, the urgency of its resolution, the extent of the
evidence required and of the legal issues to be resolved . . . .”74
The Division’s decisions are final and binding, with leave to appeal to the Swiss civil courts on very limited grounds, such as
lack of jurisdiction, violation of elementary procedural rules, or
incompatibility with public policy.75
III. CAS VERSUS THE FEDERATIONS
While the CAS has carefully developed and maintained its
rules and procedures in order to be seen as a fair and legitimate
arbitral body, the federations have yet to conform to similar
standards. The IOC needs to devote as much attention to the
federations’ appellate structures as it has to cultivating the
credibility and effectiveness of the CAS. The current state of
affairs was highlighted in two CAS decisions stemming from
the 2004 Athens Games. The first was the aforementioned controversy between South Korea and the International Gymnastics Federation (FIG).76 The second involved the United States,
France, Germany and the United Kingdom in a dispute over the
International Equestrian Federation’s (FEI) medalling decision.77 Not for the first time, the CAS drew attention to the
flaws in the federations’ internal processes, specifically the fail-

72. Id. art. 20(a)–(b).
73. Id. art. 18 (requiring resolution within twenty-four hours of the complaint in all but exceptional cases).
74. Id. art. 20(a). For example, in the case of the South Korean gymnastics
delegation’s appeal to the CAS, the parties were not prepared to argue on such
short notice. They wanted to collect affidavits, depositions, etc., so the Division referred the proceedings to the CAS. See infra Part III.A.
75. Presentation, CAS website, at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/present/
frmpres.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
76. Yang Tae Young v. FIG, CAS 2004/A/704 (Oct. 21, 2004), at http://
www.tas-cas.org/en/pdf/yang.pdf.
77. CNOSF, BOA, USOC v. FEI NOCG, CAS OG 04/007 (Aug. 21, 2004), at
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/pdf/hoy.pdf [hereinafter Hoy].
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ure of the FIG to respect its own procedures in the face of a
much-publicized controversy and the FEI’s ambiguous rules
governing both judging standards and internal appeals.78
A. The Case of Yang Tae Young
To understand the CAS’s criticism of the FIG, it is worth reviewing the events that transpired after the judges miscalculated the difficulty of Yang’s routine. According to the FIG’s
rules, protests must be lodged on the competition floor before
the next rotation begins, but the South Koreans did not enter
their challenge until the next day.79 The FIG ruled that the
protest came too late to overturn the results.80 The federation
nevertheless immediately reviewed the competition tapes and
suspended three judges for the remainder of the Athens
Games—two from Spain and Colombia who determined the incorrect start value for Yang, and an American judge who over-

78. See KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 95–99. For example, at the
1998 Nagano Games, the ad hoc Division heard an appeal from Canadian
snowboarder and gold medallist Ross Rebagliati, who disputed his postcompetition disqualification by the IOC after traces of marijuana were found
in his system. The Division had to examine the IOC’s Medical Code governing
use of drugs at the Games (replaced by the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code in 2000). It found that, according to the Medical Code, the IOC could
treat marijuana as a prohibited substance and require sanctions only if the
IOC reached an agreement to that effect with the sports federation concerned.
The IOC had never reached such an agreement with the international ski
federation, thereby nullifying the IOC’s testing provision and exonerating
Rebagliati. Also in Nagano, Ulf Samuelsson, an American citizen and NHL
player who joined the Swedish Olympic hockey team, was revealed to be an
American, and thus ineligible to play for the Swedes, two days before the
quarterfinal game. The ad hoc Division had to issue a speedy decision: the
easy part was agreeing to disqualify Samuelsson. The more difficult question
was whether to forfeit Sweden’s victories up to that point. The hockey federation’s rules called for a sanction of forfeiture, but the provision was intended
for championship tournaments, not the Olympic Games, which are structured
differently. The Division decided not to disqualify Sweden because of the perverse effect it would have on other teams who were not involved, such as Russia who would then have to play a much stronger team in the quarterfinals.
The CAS decision was lauded by the sports community, even though it contravened the hockey federation’s rules. Id.
79. See Abrahamson & Pucin, supra note 12.
80. Alan Abrahamson, Hamm Asked to Give Up Gold, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2004, at D1.
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saw the judging panel.81 This move galvanized the South Korean delegation, which requested that the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) consider a shared gold medal along the lines of
that awarded to the Canadian pairs skaters at the 2002 Salt
Lake City Games after the bribery scandal came to light.82 The
South Korean delegation also threatened to appeal the FIG’s
ruling to the CAS.83
Throughout the proceedings, the IOC refused to enter the
fray.84 The FIG, however, responded to South Korea’s persistence with a letter to the gold medallist American Paul
Hamm.85 Written by the FIG’s President Bruno Grandi, the
letter suggested that Hamm voluntarily relinquish his medal to
Yang, since Yang was “the true winner of the all-around
competition.”86 Grandi wrote that such a move “would be
recognized as the ultimate demonstration of fair play by the
whole world.”87 The USOC denounced Grandi’s request as an
attempt to deflect the FIG’s own incompetence.88
81. Id. See also Juliet Macur, Hamm Ruling Stands, but Ire at Judges
Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at A1.
82. See Abrahamson, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. IOC President Jacques Rogge stated that because the FIG had already
certified the results of the gymnastics competition, “For us that is final.” Liz
Robbins, South Korean Gymnast Appeals to Top Sports Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2004, at D5.
85. Abrahamson, supra note 80.
86. The pertinent text of Bruno Grandi’s letter read:
I wish to remind you that the FIG Executive Committee has admitted
the error of judgment made on the Parallel Bars and suspended the
three responsible judges, two from the A panel and the FIG Technical
Committee member. Indeed, the start value of the Korean gymnast
Yang Tae Young was given as 9.9 instead of 10. As a result, the true
winner of the All-Around competition is Yang Tae Young. If, (according to your declarations to the press), you would return your medal to
the Korean if the FIG requested it, then such an action would be recognized as the ultimate demonstration of fair play by the whole
world. The FIG and the IOC would highly appreciate the magnitude
of this gesture. At this moment in time, you are the only one who can
make this decision.
Letter to Paul Hamm (Aug. 26, 2004), FIG website, at http://www.figgymnastics.com/cache/html/9124-8151-10001.html.
87. Id.
88. Bill Briggs & John Meyer, USOC Rejects Plea to Forfeit Hamm’s Gold,
DENV. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at B-01.
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South Korea lodged a complaint with the ad hoc Division on
the second to last day of the Games, ten days after the disputed
competition.89 The Division scheduled a hearing for the next
day, but both the FIG’s and Hamm’s lawyers asked for an extension so that they could better prepare and summon key witnesses.90 The Division acquiesced, referring the matter to the
full CAS.91 On September 27, 2004, the hearing was held in
Lausanne, and on October 21, 2004, the CAS issued its decision
dismissing South Korea’s challenge.92
In denying the appeal, the CAS looked to its own jurisprudence on field-of-play decisions.93
It reiterated its welldeveloped rule, “[C]ourts may interfere only if an official’s fieldof-play decision is tainted by fraud or arbitrariness or corruption; otherwise although a Court may have jurisdiction it will
abstain as a matter of policy from exercising it.”94 Since there
was no evidence of judge coercion or malice, the CAS could do
nothing about the judges’ technical error, especially considering
South Korea’s late appeal.95
The CAS did take the opportunity to point out some patent
flaws in the FIG’s rules and procedures, as well as the federation’s mishandling of the dispute.96 First, the CAS acknowledged that the FIG’s complex judging hierarchy97 allowed for an
89. Yang, CAS 2004/A/704 ¶ 1.1.
90. Id. ¶¶ 1.2–.4.
91. Id. ¶ 1.5.
92. Id. ¶ 1.8.
93. Id. ¶ 3.2.
94. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 3.8.
96. Id.
97. The Judges’ Panel in artistic gymnastics consists of two groups of
judges for each round of competition, one responsible for evaluating composition and content (technical values) and the other for evaluating execution.
The Panel also has a Chairman and an expert appointed by that event’s monitoring Technical Committee. The Panel reports to the Superior Jury, which
consists of a Technical President and two experts appointed by the Technical
Committee, whose duty it is to supervise the competition, to review the marks
of judges, to deal with any error in judgment on the part of the judges, and to
respond with “such action as they consider necessary.” The Jury of Appeal
consists of two members of the FIG’s Executive Committee appointed by the
Presidential Commission, a Technical President, one member of the Technical
Committee (but not involved in the decision of the Superior Jury or the judging at the apparatus in question) or an expert judge designated by the rele-
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oversight jury to alter an “extremely incorrect score” in extraordinary circumstances; however, it was unwilling to apply this
provision to the Yang case because of the rule’s lack of guidance
on what procedures were necessary to effect such a change.98
The CAS wrote:
There is no doubt that a mechanism exists for reversing judging errors, although there did not appear to be universal familiarity with it even among those responsible for its operation,
in particular, there was an unresolved issue as to whether
special forms had to be used for the purposes of protest.99

Second, the CAS pointed out the confusion among the parties
not only as to how, but also as to when precisely before the
competition’s end a protest must be lodged.100 It noted that the
FIG’s previous version of the rules had clearly stated that written complaints had to be handed to the head of the oversight
jury “at the latest fifteen minutes after the incident.”101 The
CAS commented that the FIG was “not able to enlighten us as
to why the [Technical Rules] had been changed—or even
when—although U.S. advocates informed us that the amendments appear to date from 1989.”102 The CAS then remarked,
“We were consoled to hear from FIG that, as a result of the focus which this dispute has placed on the limitation issue, the
rules may be revised and thus attain their previous clarity.”103
The CAS also addressed the federation’s behavior in the aftermath of the competition, especially that of President Grandi:
We would respectfully suggest that FIG . . . made three mistakes, albeit, we are certain in entire good faith. Firstly, they
publicly accepted without qualification that there was an error
in the judging of their own officials. True it is that there was
an error in the start value identifiable when Yang’s performance was analysed with the aid of the Technical Video. Howvant Technical Committee. Following the conclusion of each session, the Jury
of Appeals deals with any protests lodged. It also ensures that the requirements of the statutes, technical regulations, rules and guidelines are observed. Id. ¶¶ 3.5–.10.
98. Id. ¶¶ 3.10–.14.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. ¶ 3.10 (quoting the FIG’s 1982 technical rules).
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 3.11.
103. Id.
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ever, an error identified only after a competition is complete is
immaterial to the result of the competition under FIG’s rules:
only an error identified during it, and successfully appealed,
can affect such a result. Secondly, they publicly said that, but
for such error, Yang would have won the event. This, for reasons we have already discussed, is something in realm of
speculation, not of certainty. Thirdly, they sought to persuade
Hamm to surrender his gold medal to Yang when there was no
reason for him to do so.104

The CAS specifically addressed Grandi’s suggestion to Hamm to
relinquish the gold as the “ultimate demonstration” of fair
play:105
There was an instance drawn to our attention where in the
World Trampoline Championship of 2001 an error in judging
was made and the beneficiary of it, Ms. Ka Aaeva, gave her
gold medal “in the spirit of friendship and fair play” to the
runner up Ms. Dogonadze. She did so because there was, as
was perceived, no way other than by an act of grace that the
consequences of the error could be corrected. Hamm was invited to do the same by FIG. He declined to do so. He is, in
our view, not to be criticized for this. He was not responsible
for the judges’ error; and, as we have already observed, he can
be no more certain than we as to what the outcome would
have been had the judges not made the mistake.106

While the CAS stressed Hamm’s blamelessness, his Olympic
achievement had already been tainted by the prolonged highprofile controversy.107 Because the Athens Games ended with
Hamm’s gold medal in dispute, he was denied endorsement contracts, talk show appearances and other benefits that usually
befall gold medallists.108 Hamm was also criticized in the media
for not relinquishing the gold to Yang.109
104. Id. ¶ 4.9.
105. See Alan Abrahamson, Worldwide Anti-Doping Code is Given Approval,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at 9.
106. Yang, CAS 2004/A/704 ¶ 4.10.
107. See Jill Lieber, Despite Scoring Controversy, Gymnast Hamm Feels
Golden, USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 2004, at 15C (quoting Hamm as stating that
some of the media has been “very hurtful”).
108. See Filip Bondy, Hamm Keeps Gold But Loses Charm, DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 22, 2004, at 142. Hamm’s agent, Sheryl Shade, had been under the impression that he would get a Wheaties endorsement until a last minute call
from the company, just a day after the FIG sent Hamm the letter suggesting
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B. The Case of Bettina Hoy
The equestrian Eventing competition consists of three phases:
dressage, cross-country and two rounds of show jumping where
competitors navigate a course, peppered with approximately
fifteen obstacles up to five-feet high and six-feet wide, in a limited amount of time.110 Whichever combination of horse and
rider earns the fewest penalties wins.111 During the first round
of show jumping at the Athens Games, German rider Bettina
Hoy and her horse crossed the start line, thereby triggering
both the official internal timing device and the stadium clock.112
As Hoy approached the first jump, she turned her horse away
and made a wide circle that brought her, once again, behind the
start line.113 Hoy then proceeded to cross a second time, upon
which a judge reset the stadium clock to zero.114 This led Hoy to
believe that she had finished the course within the ninetysecond time limit, while the internal timer clocked her performance at thirteen seconds exceeding the maximum.115 The FEI’s
Ground Jury, after much deliberation, applied thirteen time
penalties to Hoy, knocking her out of the gold medal position
and allowing France, Britain and the United States to medal.116
he relinquish the gold medal. According to Shade, Wheaties wanted no part of
the controversy. Id.
109. See, e.g., Ian O’Connor, Hamm Should Share Gold, not Wheaties Box,
USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2004, at 3; Bondy, supra note 108 (suggesting that
Hamm might have been more than a “disposable Olympic hero” had he
reached out to Yang during the medal ceremony or campaigned for a shared
gold medal).
110. For purposes of the Olympic competition in Eventing, all riders participate in dressage, cross-country and the first round of show jumping. Only the
top twenty-five qualify for the individual competition and the second round of
show jumping. Their scores in all four phases are used to determine their
individual standings. Hoy, CAS OG 04/007 ¶ 3.1. It was during the first
round of show jumping that Hoy crossed the start line twice. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id. ¶¶ 3.5, 7.1. The timing is crucial in show jumping because competitors must finish the course within ninety seconds. Riders must keep their
eyes both on the course and on the clock to avoid being penalized one point per
second. See id.
113. See id. ¶ 3.5.
114. Id.
115. Id. The internal computerized timing device, the official timer, clocked
Hoy’s performance at 103 seconds.
116. Id. ¶¶ 1.2, 3.6.
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However, the Germans challenged the ruling to the FEI’s Appeal Committee, which overruled the Ground Jury’s decision on
fairness grounds.117
France, Britain and the United States immediately appealed
to the ad hoc Division, which issued a decision nullifying the
Appeal Committee’s ruling.118 The Appeal Committee had
based its jurisdiction to review the Ground Jury’s decision on
the fact that the case “constituted an issue of interpretation of
the FEI Rules” and was, therefore, appealable.119 The ad hoc
Division overturned that holding, asserting that the Ground
Jury’s ruling was clearly a technical decision, i.e., whether or
not to impose a time penalty, and that it was, therefore, final
according to the FEI’s rules.120 The Division rebuked the Appeal Committee for providing a conclusory, erroneous opinion,
unsubstantiated by any supporting evidence.121 The Division
offered the following criticism:

117. Id. The Appeal Committee reasoned that the restarted stadium clock
resulted “in a clear injustice to the rider concerned,” who relied on the only
clock that she could see. Frankie Sachs, Success from the Jaws of Defeat,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 3, 2004, at 14.
118. Hoy, CAS OG 04/007 ¶ 6.1.
119. Id. ¶ 7.2. The Eventing competition is judged by a three-person
Ground Jury. Among its responsibilities is to rule on all times and penalties
in the show jumping events. The Ground Jury is “ultimately responsible for
the jumping of the event and for settling all problems that may arise during
its jurisdiction.” Id. Any field-of-play decision by the Ground Jury is final,
i.e., not reviewable by the Appeal Committee. See id.
120. Id. ¶¶ 8.2, 8.6.
121. The Appeal Committee’s decision (written in the third-person) in its
entirety:
The Appeal Committee started by considering whether they had jurisdiction to deal with the case presented. The Committee agreed
that the case came under Art 163.6 as an interpretation of the rules
and so agreed to proceed with the hearing.
The Appeal Committee considered the appeal of the German Federation against the time penalties awarded to Bettina Hoy during the
Eventing Team Jumping and Individual Qualifier.
The Committee concluded that the countdown had been restarted resulting in a clear injustice to the rider concerned. The Committee
therefore removed the time penalties.
Id. ¶ 3.6 (quoting the Appeal Committee decision).
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If it had been an interpretation or construction issue, one
would have expected, at the very least, an explicit reference to
the rule or rules giving rise to such issue [in the Committee’s
decision]. No such reference occurs and none can be inferred.
The mere assumption by the Appeal Committee, in deliberating the appeal, that it concerned an interpretation of rules
could not have the effect of creating such issue or of converting
a factual issue into a legal one . . . .122

The Division pointed to drafting problems within the FEI’s
rules that might have contributed to the Appeal Committee’s
error.123 It questioned Article 163.6.1 of the FEI’s General
Regulations, which reads:
Art. 163. There . . . is no appeal against decisions of the
Ground Jury in the following cases:
6.1. Where the question for decision was what in fact happened during a competition or where marks are awarded for
performance; Examples (which are not exhaustive): whether
an obstacle was knocked down, whether a horse was disobedient . . . what was the time taken for the round, or whether an
obstacle was jumped within the time; whether, according to
the Rules, the particular track followed by a competitor has
caused him to incur a penalty. Contrast questions involving
interpretation of the Rules, which can be the subject of appeal.124

The Division wrote of this rule:
It is clear that the ruling of the Ground Jury in deciding to
impose a time penalty on Ms. Hoy was of a purely factual nature falling within its exclusive jurisdiction. There is no merit
in the suggestion by the FEI . . . that this ruling involved an
interpretation of rules as apparently envisaged, with no particular lucidity, in the last sentence appended, it would seem,
to Article 163.6.1.125

122. Id. ¶ 8.3.
123. Id. ¶ 7.2.
124. Id. ¶ 7.2 (alteration in original).
125. Although it found no need to reach this alternate claim, the Division
noted that the Appeal Committee’s decision also violated due process because
the affected parties had not been notified of the appeal hearing. Id. ¶¶ 4.2,
8.2, 8.5.
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The Division also addressed the German delegation’s opposition to the CAS’s jurisdiction based on a provision in the FEI
statute forbidding challenges to Appeal Committee decisions.126
Even though the Division dismissed the frivolous claim, it still
had to address the rule’s plain language denying the CAS’s
well-established jurisdiction.127 Valuable time was wasted on
an issue that should not have been in contention.128 The FEI’s
own representative at the arbitration hearing did not bring the
same jurisdictional challenge; presumably, he knew the FEI
rules denying the CAS jurisdiction were outdated and irrelevant.129
IV. REWRITING THE RULES
There are two prevailing views on how courts of arbitration
should treat the rules governing a sports body.130 The first suggests construing the organization’s rulebook sensibly, in accordance with the spirit of the activity to which it applies, rather
than in an overly technical manner.131 This view is countered
by the idea that such rules are quasi-statutory at this point in
the development of sports and they need to be predictable and
clear, especially in the disciplinary context where athletes de126. Id. ¶ 6.1. The Division wrote:
[The German team] submitted at the outset that the CAS ad hoc Division did not have jurisdiction to hear the present appeal by reason
of the provisions of Article 170.2.2 of the FEI General Regulations.
In accordance with this Article, appeals against decisions of the Appeal Committee on appeal from the Ground Jury were not appealable, regardless of whether the Appeal Committee had jurisdiction or
not. There is no merit in this submission, which was not supported
by [the FEI itself]. As mentioned before . . . Article 170.2.2 is in conflict with . . . a variety of other binding provisions relating to the jurisdiction of CAS.
Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 6.1.
127. Id.
128. The issue of the CAS’s jurisdiction at the Olympic Games is wellsettled. See KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 24–25.
129. Leaving irrelevant, conflicting rules in the statutes of sports organizations leads to confusion and squandered effort. See Hoy, CAS OG 04/007 ¶¶
2.5, 6.1.
130. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 2.40. See J. Paul McCutcheon, Sports
Discipline and the Rule of Law, in LAW AND SPORT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
115, 116 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2000).
131. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 2.40.
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serve fair notice of offenses and sanctions.132 The CAS, like
most tribunals, favors the former view, striving for purposive
construction, i.e., to “discern the intention of the rule-makers,
and not to frustrate it.”133 However, this reasoned approach
often falls apart: it is impossible to discern a drafter’s intent
where the plain language contradicts itself and where additions
and amendments have been made without an eye to the document as a whole.134
In the instant case, the rules detailing the appellate procedures of the FIG and the FEI did not provide adequate guidance
to those obliged to follow, implement and interpret them.135 The
ambiguity caused the CAS—in an attempt at purposive construction—to vet the federations’ rulebooks.136 This works
against the quick and efficient resolution that the IOC envisioned when it authorized the CAS to arbitrate the Olympic
Games.137 To remedy the situation, the IOC could develop a
model internal appeals system that each federation must adopt
in order to maintain its IOC-recognized status. Instead of the
various configurations of Ground Juries and Appeal Committees with convoluted jurisdictional and procedural rules, the
132. See McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 121. McCutcheon argues that
especially in the context of disciplinary rules, “offenses should be defined in
advance and with sufficient clarity so as to put athletes on notice” of the prohibited conduct and sanctions. Broad, open-ended offenses such as “bringing
the game into disrepute” or “misconduct” that are contained in many sports
codes do not give reasonable notice of what is proscribed, and they are liable
to place too much discretion in the hands of the decision-maker. Id.
133. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 2.40, 1.18 (the CAS’s decisions have
reflected and promoted “the distinctive sporting principles of fair play and
good sportsmanship in applying technical rules; the equality of athletes before
the law; the construction of sporting rules so as not to distort their purpose; a
respect for sporting decisions; and a flexible and pragmatic approach to entry
deadlines.”).
134. See id. § 2.38 (noting the CAS’s recent criticism of “drafting that engenders controversy”).
135. See id. § 2.38 n.26 (citing previous CAS decisions that criticized federation rules).
136. See supra Part III.
137. The IOC’s vision for the ad hoc Division was that it would be “simple,
flexible and free of charge.” See Reeb, supra note 15, Decentralised CAS Offices and the Ad Hoc Divisions para. 2. The CAS’s duty is to “ensure that the
appropriate regulations have been observed and that the principles of due
process and natural justice have been followed pursuant to the rules established for CAS.” Id.
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IOC could establish a simple hierarchy, a single set of rules
governing when and how a protest can be lodged, and a clear
policy on how to deal fairly with challenges. The basic rules
would be known to all and used by all participating in the
Olympic Games.138 Any CAS solution to problems that might
arise would be disseminated for the benefit and strengthening
of all similarly affected.139 The federations would be able to tailor the model to their own particular needs and would retain
independence in judgment-making, but a common structure
would imbue the regime with an objectivity that it currently
lacks.
A. The WADA Precedent
The IOC’s successful implementation of an anti-doping regime throughout the Olympic Movement supplies strong evidence that it could introduce a similar initiative aimed at overhauling the federations’ appeals systems. Its development of
the Anti-Doping Code in 2000 led to the creation of the independent World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 2003.140 Not
only has WADA set international standards for drug testing, it
has also promulgated a set of model rules adopted by world
sports organizations, including the federations, that cover testing, sanctions and appeals.141 WADA was a solution born of

138. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 8.122–.124. Beloff suggests an
even broader solution, i.e., that every nation adopt a unitary dispute resolution forum that would have final redress before the CAS. He criticizes sports
bodies that continue to internally resolve their own disputes and sees the
CAS’s experience and pedigree as making it the best model for replication. Id.
139. Furthermore, having each federation follow a common model might
help federation leaders adhere to the rules in the face of public pressures or,
alternatively, give the IOC a reason to monitor the federations’ leadership to
make sure they remain uninfluenced by politics, media pressure and other
considerations.
140. See About WADA, WADA website, at http://www.wada-ama.org (last
visited Apr. 14, 2005). The Olympic Anti-Doping Code codified the disparate
rules and procedures of the federations, CAS awards, and judicial decisions
from various domestic courts. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 161.
141. WADA: Model of Best Practice for International Federations, Draft
version 2.0 (July 23, 2003), at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document
/if_model_rules_v2.pdf. As it did with the CAS, the IOC encouraged and developed the creation of WADA, but stepped away from it in order to preserve
its legitimacy and, presumably, to encourage sports organizations to adopt the
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necessity.142 In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, incidents of athlete doping continued to rise.143 The IOC’s attempts
to create a comprehensive anti-doping policy were continually
thwarted.144 It already had jurisdiction over the problem
through the Olympic Charter,145 but it could not find a means of
effective implementation.146 Getting the sports bodies to agree
on an official list of prohibited substances; developing acceptable, well-documented laboratory testing procedures; and securing the participation of all world sports organizations proved
problematic.147 Drug testing remained notoriously haphazard.148 There was even evidence of state-administered doping

Model Rules. WADA is now an independent organization, funded in equal
parts by the Olympic Movement and various national governments. See id.
142. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 152–53. At the 1983 Pan American
Games, twelve athletes were disqualified for failing drug tests. At the 1984
Los Angeles Games, eleven athletes were expelled from competition. At the
1987 Pan American Games, six athletes were disqualified. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 2(8) (stating the IOC’s mission to lead the fight
against doping in sports), R. 45 (eligibility code requiring participants to respect and comply with the World Anti-Doping Code), R. 48 (providing for a
Medical Commission to implement it). Id. There are also IOC-accredited labs
which conduct drug testing. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 148.
146. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 151–55. The IOC first instituted antidoping rules in 1967, and it required each competition site to have testing
facilities and each competitor to submit to testing in the 1970s. Then in 1987
the IOC’s Medical Commission recommended to the international federations
a two-tiered sanction plan in an effort to encourage uniform standards, and a
comprehensive International Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport.
However, this accord overlapped, contradicted and conflicted with multiple
other accords inspired at the same time, such as the U.S.-Soviet Mutual Doping Control Agreement, a multilateral agreement based on the U.S.-Soviet
pact and supervised by the IOC’s Medical Commission, the Council of
Europe’s Anti-Doping Convention, and a trilateral agreement between Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Id.
147. Id. at 149–55.
148. Id. at 152. For example, the Athletic Congress of the USA (TAC) refused to conduct extensive drug tests at its track-and-field trials leading up to
the 1983 Pan American Games, despite heavy lobbying by the chair of TAC
women’s track-and-field committee, who felt that TAC’s reluctance to test for
illegal drugs was an implicit condonation. Id.
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and passivity among sports administrators entrusted with the
task of policing athletes.149
WADA was the compromise necessary to get the disparate
organizations on board. The IOC-recognized federations, as
well as those sports bodies who do not participate in the Olympic Games, have all signed on to WADA.150 It is flexible enough
to preserve each federation’s decision-making autonomy, while
providing a comprehensive common framework.151 WADA offers
training assistance in implementing the model rules and tailoring them to the needs of each organization.152 Signatories
(called “stakeholders”) may modify the rules or develop their
own, subject to review and approval by WADA.153 All of these
attributes can be carried over to a similar system targeting internal appeals.
B. Incentives for the Federations
If the IOC could propose a model framework with both the
flexibility and structure of WADA, the federations might embrace the idea as a more attractive option than being berated by
CAS decisions and media criticisms after high-profile disputes.
They struggle every time their internal flaws are caught in the
149. Id. During the Cold War, massive sports programs, particularly in
China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, used doping as a performance
enhancer in international competitions. Id.
150. Abrahamson, supra note 105. WADA has been approved by sixty-five
sports federations and seventy-three national governments. Id. As with the
arbitration clause, the IOC required all sports bodies participating in the
Olympic Games to adopt WADA into their by-laws by the start of the 2004
Athens Games. Code Acceptance, WADA website, at www.wada-ama.org (last
visited Apr. 14, 2005).
151. The federations have not relinquished their autonomy or control in the
WADA regime. For example, they grant Therapeutic Use Exceptions (TUE’s)
to athletes who need to take prescribed medications that contain prohibited
substances. While the IOC can review the TUE’s to see if they are in compliance with the relevant rules and then inform the federations and WADA of its
advisory opinion, it cannot overrule the federation’s decision. Furthermore, if
a federation sanctions an athlete for doping as a result of a federation-ordered
test, the IOC must respect the decision as long as the procedures used were in
accordance with WADA standards. See WADA Independent Observers Report, Olympic Summer Games Athens 2004, at 63, 80, at http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/AthensIOReport.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
152. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 162.
153. Id.
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spotlight. After the Salt Lake City scandal, the International
Skating Union scrambled to implement an improved judging
system.154 Shortly before the Yang hearing at the CAS, the FIG
met in Turkey to revise its rules and structure.155 Instituting a
model appellate system might be a welcome alternative to such
piecemeal and reactionary reform, especially since it would
likely be developed through the money, expertise and support of
both the IOC and the federations, as was the case with
WADA.156
Furthermore, each time the CAS is forced to make basic
sense out of a federation’s conflicting, inarticulate rules, it detracts from the CAS’s true role of deciding whether those rules
were fairly applied.157 The CAS has been criticizing the federations on this point for most of its short existence.158 Those directly rebuked have scrambled to improve, but others have let
comparable flaws persist. This lack of proactive response to
CAS decisions undermines the CAS as an authoritative body
when, ironically, the federations have largely embraced it.159
Not only do they encounter the ad hoc Division during the
Olympic Games, but many federations have voluntarily submitted to the CAS’s compulsory jurisdiction in all their business
dealings.160 It is in the federations’ own interest to further legitimize the CAS.161
154. See Roberts, supra note 7 (describing the Salt Lake City bribery incident and subsequent changes to the skating federation’s scoring system).
155. Thomson, supra note 12.
156. The WADA rules were developed through the collective efforts of the
IOC, the federations, the NOC’s and other world sports organizations. Funding, WADA website, at http://www.wada-ama.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
157. See supra Part III.
158. See supra note 135.
159. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 166.
160. Id.
161. But see the reprinted speech of Paul H. Haagen, Professor of Sports
Law at Duke University, “Have the Wheels Already Been Invented? The
Court of Arbitration for Sport as a Model of Dispute Resolution,” at
http://www.law.duke.edu/sportscenter/haagen.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
Professor Haagen expresses mixed feelings about the effectiveness of the CAS
as the leading governing body of the sports world. He does not feel the CAS
has shown its complete independence from the IOC, federations and NOC’s.
Furthermore, the CAS, like other arbitral bodies, is not tied to precedent. In
his estimation, the CAS has all the “advantages that come with greater informality and all of the disadvantages of them as well.” Id. at 7.
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Those opposed to a model appeals system might cite issues of
autonomy and argue that world sports bodies, especially the
federations, have flourished under the current regime.162 The
federations have endured for decades with unique structures by
building alliances and developing distinct cultures.163 They
have become powerful international institutions and serve as
an important counterweight to the IOC.164 Having the IOC dictate yet another far-reaching policy that impacts the federations’ internal structures might damage the balance of power.165
However, such “autonomy” can also be seen as a quagmire of
rules, procedures, policies and politics, a most inadequate, confused system for an increasingly sophisticated sports world.166
Having uniform appellate structures would not encroach on the
federations’ inherent discretion and would leave intact their
oversight experts and technical criteria. There would be even
less cause for alarm if the model rules were infused with the
same flexibility as the WADA rules, allowing for reasonable
modification to accommodate specific needs.167
162. On the other hand, some would argue that improved internal appeals
are not enough:
[B]rilliant athletes at the peak of their career can be destroyed by the
absence of coherent and independent dispute resolution procedures
which guarantee natural rights and fair process. Such a body must
command respect, trust and confidence of participants, governing
bodies and the public alike. It must be truly independent, not merely
providing better conducted disciplinary committees and appeal panels within the respective National Associations and International
Federations.
Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 17.
163. See supra Part II.B, describing the federations’ duties and powers.
164. Id.
165. An argument could be made, however, that the federations’ autonomy
has always been limited by their contractual obligations to the IOC, and that
the IOC has jurisdiction over the federations’ internal appeals systems to the
extent that the latter are integral to CAS arbitration. See OLYMPIC CHARTER
R. 74.
166. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 2.38, 8.121.
167. See About WADA, WADA website, at http://www.wada-ama.org (last
visited Apr. 14, 2005); BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 1.18, 8.121 (arguing for
a body of sports law, a unitary code of rules applicable to the resolution of
sports disputes both domestic and international, spearheaded by CAS decisions); Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 47 (“I believe that the CAS process is the template for all competitive sports. If their procedures were adopted worldwide
then there would be more harmonisation of the procedural rules of national
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V. LEX SPORTIVA
This proposed solution, the WADA model, the CAS’s opinions,
and even the creation of the CAS itself, all reflect a new phase
in the development of sports, one that requires a cohesive body
of sports law.168 As competitions have become more sophisticated and commercialized, the customary ad hoc rules governing sports have transitioned into more formal, less flexible legalistic regimes.169 Fifty years ago, sports were largely played
by gentlemen and amateurs according to the Corinthian ethic
(“It’s not whether you win or lose . . . .”).170 Referee and umpire
decisions were final and inviolate; disciplinary standards were
casual.171 In contrast, today’s sports participants are willing to
seek courts and arbitrators to resolve their disputes.172 Elite
sports have become more of a business than a competitive recreational activity.173 The financial stakes involved are so great
that the conventions of the marketplace govern, rather than
those of the clubhouse.174
and international sports governing bodies and the legitimate interest of the
sport, of sportsmen and sportswomen and the public would be satisfied.”).
168. See McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 116. McCutcheon describes himself as a traditionalist who espouses a non-interventionist approach, so he
sees the legalizing of sports to be regrettable; however, he recognizes that it is
the inevitable result of sports’ development. Id.
169. Id. McCutcheon writes:
[S]port by its nature is a rule-based activity that ready facilitates a
disciplinary function. A myriad of rules—playing rules, eligibility
rules, competition rules and the like—governs the regular conduct of
sport and, in consequence, it is necessary to establish an apparatus to
ensure the interpretation and enforcement of those rules. An inevitable result of the organization and codification of sports rules is the
corresponding development of an adjudicative and interpretive function, thus, in effect, sports have developed their own internal “legal
systems.”
Id.
170. Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 1.
171. Id.
172. See McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 116. Perhaps an even more compelling change in society than its move toward litigiousness, is its expectation
that sports should reflect the higher virtues of honesty and moral integrity.
Id. at 118. “This demand is uniquely strong in the case of sport and is not
made in respect of many other aspects of human activity.” Id.
173. Id. at 116–17.
174. Id. at 117. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 664.
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Those skeptical of the idea of recognizing an independent
body of sports law might argue that it amounts to a series of
cases arising in tort, contract law, administrative law, health
law, etc., that happen to involve sports.175 While this is undoubtedly true, the reality is that national and international
laws are beginning to treat sports activity, sports organizations,
and the resolution of sports disputes, differently from other areas of law.176 Discrete sports doctrines are taking shape, as evidenced by the deference of many domestic courts toward decision-making bodies like the CAS.177 Sports have assumed great
political significance.178 Many countries have sports ministries,
and governmental involvement in sport at a variety of levels is
normal.179 Sports law is developing from a powerful mixture of
commercial interests, international competition and public demand; growing, not from any treaty entered into by sovereign
states, but from international agreements among independent

175. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.6. According to Beloff, the debate
is between traditionally minded, purist lawyers who distrust activity-led “vertical” fields of law, preferring the surer, traditional ground of rule-led “horizontal” law. Id.
176. See id. § 1.7.
177. Id. Many domestic courts have firmly established a region of autonomy
for decision-making sports bodies, within which the courts decline to intervene
without a compelling reason. Id.
178. Id. § 1.4. Beloff writes:
In South Africa the effort to end apartheid was driven forward, with
considerable success, by the sporting boycott. Rights of full citizenship for all aroused high passions in South Africa, but so did rugby,
cricket, athletics and soccer, for access to which white South Africans
were prepared to pay a high political price. When Georgia became an
independent state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one of the
first acts of its inaugural government was to apply to join FIFA, the
world governing body of association football. To the Georgian people,
this was probably just as much a badge of sovereign independence as
formal recognition by other states, membership in the UN, or other
conventional indicia of statehood.
Id.
179. McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 117. It has become the norm for governments to enthusiastically endorse bids to host the Olympic Games and
other premiere sporting events. Id. See also BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §
1.10 n.8 (noting Malaysia as an example of a country where sports are heavily
governed by statute).
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bodies, in particular the Olympic Charter and the various organizations that form the Olympic Movement.180
This developing body of sports law has been variously defined
as a “dynamic, although still incomplete process to avoid, manage and resolve disputes among athletes, national sports bodies,
international sports organizations and governments,”181 as well
as a “loose but increasingly cohesive body of rules . . . an unusual form of international constitutional principle prescribing
the limited autonomy of non-governmental decision making
bodies in sport.”182 The decisions of the CAS are seen as substantively guiding the movement:183
Arbitral awards are normally binding only in the cases and on
the parties to which they are addressed. Unlike judicial decisions in common law systems, arbitral awards therefore have
no currency as stare decisis . . . . In practice, however, the
awards and opinions of the CAS provide guidance in later
cases, strongly influence later awards, and often function as
precedent. Also, by reinforcing and helping elaborate established rules and principles of international sports law, the accretion of CAS awards and opinions is gradually forming a

180. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.10.
181. Polvino, supra note 16, at 364.
182. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.12.
183. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 48. Furthermore, the Olympic Movement lies at the heart of the legal processes driving the development of international sports law. The movement is unique because it is non-governmental
and well-organized, although “at present, the Olympic Charter falls well short
of being a transnational constitution for sport. No one institution has a monopoly of jurisdiction over sport internationally.” Id. However, there are
some normative trends in the hierarchy of world sports:
[N]ational sports bodies resolve disputes within their sports and
within their borders; international federations review decisions of national bodies within a particular sport; National Olympic Committees
operate across different sports and intervene in disputes at a national
level; the organs of the International Olympic Committee or an international federation may review a decision of a National Olympic
Committee; independent arbitration panels may deal with ad hoc
disputes; and finally the courts of various countries may become involved, and in particular normally recognize and enforce foreign arbitration awards or court judgments to the extent that their national
law so provides, in accordance with international agreements and
principles of comity, reciprocity and judicial cooperation.
BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 8.91–.92.
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source of that body of law. This source has been called the lex
sportiva.184

CAS opinions have introduced some general legal principles
into the arena of sports law, such as deference to field-of-play
decisions; purposive interpretation of rules and regulations;
protection of athletes’ rights to due process, including the right
to a fair hearing and notice; and the contractual norms of good
faith,185 benefit of the doubt186 and legitimate expectations.187
The CAS has also focused on harmonizing the procedural and
substantive rules used by national and international sports
governing bodies.188 This is a lofty goal, and it is unlikely that
there will ever be complete uniformity. Nevertheless, as leaders of the sports law movement, the IOC, the CAS and the international federations have a duty to eliminate as many variables as possible.189 Bolstering the IOC’s arbitration scheme

184. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 48. But see Haagen, supra note 161, at 7.
185. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 7.116–.127. Beloff illustrates the legal
principle of good faith with the case of a water-polo player who tested positive
for salbutamol, a substance allowed by FINA, the international federation
governing water sports, as long as it is disclosed prior to a doping test. The
player had not disclosed the salbutamol; however, he was able to demonstrate
that on his national federation’s list of banned and permitted substances, the
substance was listed as permitted, without any other indication or conditions.
The CAS annulled the sanction, asserting that an athlete should be able to
trust information given to him by his national federation. Id.
186. Id. § 7.122. In a horse-doping case where jars containing urine samples were not sealed in accordance with the FEI’s regulations, it was impossible to formally exclude any possibility of manipulation or contamination of the
jars. Therefore, the CAS considered this an element of doubt which had to
benefit the athlete. Id.
187. Id. § 7.124. Where a sporting organization chooses to temporarily depart from its established rules in certain circumstances, athletes unaware of
the change cannot be bound by such arbitrary moves. Id.
188. See Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 43 (“Its principal aim was and is to secure
the settlement of sports related disputes with a longer term objective of harmonising the procedural rules of national and international sports governing
bodies.”). See also NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 51 (“It is true that one of the
interests of [CAS] is to develop a jurisprudence that can be used as a reference
by all the actors of world sport, thereby encouraging the harmonization of the
judicial rules and principles applied within the sports world.”).
189. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 179 (“Ongoing efforts to simplify and
better coordinate the unwieldy structure for resolving disputes, in particular,
and to improve the accountability of the pertinent institutions, will benefit
athletes, sports organizations and the public alike.”).
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with a more precise and predictable federation-wide appellate
system is an important step toward that harmonization.190
Kristin L. Savarese∗

190. See id. at 162.
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